CAN CITISTAT WORK IN GREATER BOSTON?

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CitiStat has given the city of Baltimore a powerful new management tool. By tracking "real time" data, the mayor and other city officials not only develop strategies for improving everyday performance in all departments, but also get a look at the broad patterns shaping the city. Can the CitiStat approach be brought to state and local government in Massachusetts?

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Every other week, the director of every department in the City of Baltimore takes the "hot seat" in a meeting room on the sixth floor of City Hall. Flanked by colleagues, the department head stands at a podium and answers a series of questions from a panel headed by Mayor Martin O'Malley and his top aides. The discussion addresses every issue facing the department – staffing levels, absenteeism, overtime, deployment of staff, department facilities and vehicles, response rates for citizen requests, capital budgeting, and more. As the conversation takes place, staff members project images on two giant screens behind the podium. The images show maps, charts, graphs, spreadsheets, and photographs – all designed to illustrate how well or how poorly the department is doing its job.

The discussion is spirited. Sometimes, the mayor shows impatience with park equipment that has not been fixed or an event that was not staffed well. Other times, the mayor and his staff take the opportunity to congratulate the department officials for improving performance. Sometimes, the mayor rewards city workers with tickets to a sports event or concert. Always, the goal is to set goals, meet them – and then to set a new, higher goal. The discussion is blunt, but also has a distinct Southern courtliness.

Most impressive to many visitors is how knowledgeable city officials are about every aspect of the issues and trends in the departments. In a matter of seconds, officials can retrieve the facts about the issues. The conversation moves from the micro level to the macro level and back again. Information about municipal affairs is formatted down to the block level, but officials can also identify the trends across the city.

'CitiStat exponentially broadens a mayor's vision of their city.' Baltimore's First Deputy Mayor Michael Enright.

Before the meetings take place, the mayor's staff pore over hundreds of pages of spreadsheets filled with data on every aspect of city government to prepare summaries for the mayor. Key staffers from the Mayor's Office look for patterns and trends in the data, partly to understand the dimensions of the city's myriad problems but also to develop strategies to better deploy limited manpower and resources. If a neighborhood suffers from property abandonment, the maps and data might indicate where to shore up neighborhoods and where to triage. If a community experiences a health epidemic, the data provide clues about how to mobilize health workers. If the city experiences an outbreak of car thefts or heroin sales, the police know how to deploy in force.

The name of the program that so engages City Hall is CitiStat. A database-driven management tool, CitiStat provides a vehicle for city officials – and ordinary citizens – to know what is going on in city government and how it all adds up. Baltimore officials say that they have realized over $40 million in financial savings since the advent of CitiStat – a figure that does not take into account the value of more effective and equitable municipal services.

CitiStat is part of a larger emphasis on improving public services. Instead of focusing on high-profile development or redistribution efforts, City Hall has focused intensely on simply making sure that the everyday operations take place in a rational, informed, businesslike fashion. By pursuing the kind of basic "housekeeping" functions that many executives leave to their deputies, Mayor O'Malley hopes to leverage larger changes throughout the city. Relentlessly focusing on the little stuff – like eradicating rats and lead paint, improving emergency and firefighting response times, and repairing playgrounds and streets – City Hall hopes to improve the overall quality of life in the city. By so doing, the city will have a better chance to keep and attract businesses and middle-class residents.

Might Greater Boston and Massachusetts learn something from the efforts of Baltimore?

WHAT IS CITISTAT?

CitiStat is an accountability and assessment tool for everyday management and longterm planning in government. The system uses simple computer databases to track every conceivable aspect of public policy challenges and government performance. After department officials gather data and enter it into computer databases, CitiStat's policy analysts pore over the information, provide summaries of key trends and issues, and create visual depictions of the data in maps, charts, and graphs. Every other week, the mayor and his top aides meet with

officials from each department. At these sessions, officials review the data to assess whether departments are meeting short- and long-term goals and to determine strategies for improvement of performance.

"CitiStat exponentially broadens a mayor's vision of their city," says Baltimore's First Deputy Mayor Michael Enright. CitiStat is not alone in the world of data-driven tools for performance assessment. According to Jane Fountain, director of the National Center for Digital Government at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, CitiStat is best understood as an "executive-information system" like those used by corporations such as Frito-Lay or Mrs. Field's Cookies. The central offices of these corporations constantly have access to a stream of real-time information about which products are selling, at what stores, at what profit margins, and with what strain on overtime and other resources. They allocate resources and shift their product mix accordingly.

To start, officials focused on data they already had about personnel issues—in particular, excessive absenteeism and overtime.

Based on the CompStat program pioneered by the New York Police Department, the City of Baltimore began applying the approach to major city agencies shortly after Martin O'Malley's election as mayor in 1999. CompStat has been credited with playing a major role in the reduction of crime in New York in the 1990s. Rather than simply responding to 911 telephone calls reporting crimes, CompStat records and maps a wide range of data on a variety of crimes, such as burglaries, robberies, assaults, drug sales, car thefts, subway fare evasion, and murders. Rather than simply reacting to crimes after they happen, New York police deploy in areas where they can expect crime to happen based on recent patterns – and either prevent it from happening altogether or arrest perpetrators in the act. In the early days of CompStat, crimes were tracked by putting pushpins on a wall map. Soon after the program was established, police officers entered data into computers, which then plot the data on maps, charts, and graphs.

Soon after his election, O'Malley asked Jack Maple, the architect of New York's CompStat, to bring the police database system to Baltimore. O'Malley and Maple then decided to expand the system beyond policing to every function of city government. The new program, dubbed CitiStat, hired a small staff and took over a little-used room in City Hall. Every department meets with the mayor and his staff in this room every other week. The CitiStat staff and top mayoral aides worked with officials from city departments to determine what kinds of activities and resources should be measured and tracked on a regular basis. To start, the officials focused on data about personnel issues – in particular, excessive absenteeism and overtime. Building on the departments' existing data collection, the Mayor's Office added other measures that might show how well the departments do their jobs. From the program's beginning in 2000 until 2002, the CitiStat program grew from one department (the Bureau of Solid Waste within Public Works) to 16 departments and issues.

DEPARTMENTS AND ISSUE GROUPS INVOLVED WITH CITISTAT

Finance Department
Fire Department
Health Department
Housing and Community Development Department
Police Department
Public Works Department – Bureau of General Services
Public Works Department – Bureau of Solid Waste
Public Works Department – Bureau of Water and Wastewater
Recreation and Parks Department
Transportation Department
Housing Authority of Baltimore City
Homeless Services
KidStat
Information Technology
ProjectStat
Minority Business Enterprise and Women's Business Enterprise

Before the biweekly meetings for each department, analysts from the CitiStat Office assess the department's performance on a wide range of issues and identify important trends. Departments submit raw data to the CitiStat team, which then formats data into digital maps and charts. Those graphics are projected on large screens in the CitiStat Room. Maps and other graphics help identify trouble spots and ways to better target resources. A department chief might be asked, "Why is garbage pick-up so much slower in that neighborhood?" or "Why is your absenteeism rate still so high?" The free-flowing meetings serve a number of functions: to encourage a culture of accountability, increase transparency, increase coordination between agencies, recognize high-performing employees, expose inefficiencies, and improve performance.

CitiStat has produced over $43 million of cost savings, cost avoidances, and revenue enhancements in its first three years.

Starting in March 2002, CitiStat was supplemented with CitiTrak. This program created a single telephone line – 311, similar to the well-known 911 line for police calls – for citizens to report problems and complaints to all city departments. The 311 call center inputs each caller "service request" and refers it to the appropriate department. Callers are given a tracking number they can use for followup calls. The system not only offers a streamlined system for managing all calls to the city, but also makes departments accountable for every call that the city gets. In addition, the calls provide fresh data on trends and issues of concern to the city.

The technology for CitiStat is basic. Baltimore began with Microsoft Excel spreadsheet programs that departments already had on their desktop computers. Geographic Information

Systems (GIS) mapping software from ArcView, costing less than $1,000, was used to show patterns of service delivery across the city and its neighborhoods. Setting up the CitiStat room, with modern computers, projection screens, desks and podiums, cost $20,000. The total start-up and operating cost of the program in its inaugural year was $285,000; CitiStat now costs $400,000. Ninety-seven percent of operating costs are now staff salaries.

According to the Mayor's Office, CitiStat has produced over $43 million in cost savings, cost avoidances, and revenue enhancements in its first three years of operation and has also helped to improve municipal services. Baltimore is one of the few major cities not crippled by budget deficits in the current economic slowdown. The city of Baltimore is not laying off workers, cutting services, or increasing taxes. The budget for 2004 is 3.2 percent larger than 2003. One reason for Baltimore's strong fiscal position is its ability to control overtime and absenteeism. Outside of the police, overtime has fallen 40 percent. The city has also reduced its backlog of cleanup projects, increased drug-treatment services, planted more trees, abated lead paint in a record number of homes, and reduced the incidence of infant mortality. Employment in the city has increased by ten thousand workers while violent crime has decreased 29 percent.

Greater Boston offers a favorable environment for an innovation like CitiStat. A number of research initiatives have already gathered a wealth of social and policy indicators for Greater Boston that could be easily integrated with real-time information systems such as CitiStat

CitiStat meetings are now regularly visited by delegations from around North America. Pittsburgh, Miami and Los Angeles County have adopted pilot CitiStat programs. Other cities from Chattanooga to Anchorage have launched performance-measurement programs that also seek to imitate CitiStat. In Massachusetts, Somerville Mayor Dorothy Kelly Gay in 2002 developed a pilot program involving three departments. A number of Massachusetts state agencies and cities and towns are considering bringing CitiStat to the Bay State.

On September 16, the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston and the National Center for Digital Government, both based at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, hosted a day-long conference on CitiStat. That event – which featured presentations by Baltimore First Deputy Mayor Michael Enright and CitiStat Director Matthew Gallagher, attracted 100 state and municipal officials interested in adapting the program.

Greater Boston offers a favorable environment for a government innovation like CitiStat. Massachusetts government is famously fragmented among competing levels and antiquated bodies. Top officials from the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services and the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs have indicated an interest in bringing CitiStat to the Commonwealth. A number of research initiatives – notably, the Boston Indicators Project (www.bostonindicators.org) and the Heart of the City Project (www.heartofcity.info) – have already gathered a wealth of social and policy indicators for Greater

SIMILAR BUT DIFFERENT: WHAT CITISTAT IS NOT

CitiStat differs from other kinds of public-sector accountability and assessment systems.

Government 'report cards' – Several cities have adopted scorecards, mayor's performance reports, or other forms of regular assessments. Albuquerque, for example, measures its progress against a set of five-year goals. The District of Columbia generates its scorecard from annually polling citizens about conditions and services. Greater Boston enjoys the independent Boston Indicators Project that collects and presents detailed information about hundreds of measures over time, often by neighborhood. These snapshots are taken annually, or at most quarterly. They help set priorities, remind officials about goals, and indicate progress. They do not, however, play a role in day-to-day management of public agencies.

Neighborhood-based departmental goal setting – Regular neighborhood meetings can provide accountability and set goals for local agencies. In Chicago, police "beats" convene regular meetings to elicit community goals and priorities. The goals are then prominently posted within the station. Advocates are assigned within the department to ensure that officers adhere to these goals. This process allows local participants to deliberate and debate for developing a community viewpoint with official status. The local deliberations, however, lack strong mechanisms to ensure that the central administration is oriented towards implementing their specific priorities. In Baltimore, the situation is the opposite. Residents are not intimately involved with setting performance criteria. The mayor's office examines data about resident complaints and consults with departmental heads. But the mayor then takes strong responsibility for performance on these measures.

CompStat – There are differences between CitiStat and its progenitor in the New York City Police Department. Each precinct commander in New York City is present when other commanders are on the "hot seat." In addition to the feedback commanders receive from their superiors, they are also informed by comparisons with their peers and motivated by the fact that their peers are watching them. Baltimore tracks a far more diverse array of government activities. Having every departmental head in the room when any department is being discussed would be impractical. Water maintenance is different from law enforcement or waste removal. The CitiStat analysts play an important role because they must apply lessons across agencies.

Unofficial complaint and service logs – Unofficial websites can prod government into better service by logging complaints and asking officials to record resolved problems. Boston City Councilor Maura A. Hennigan in October 2003 launched a website for registering Boston potholes that sends complaints to the Department of Public Works. Unlike CitiStat, officials are not compelled to enter data about repairs. As a public-relations tool for increasing accountability, Internet logs may prompt governmental action. But they do not reliably access performance, reveal opportunities for improving efficiency, or call officials to regularly answer for results.

Boston that could be easily integrated with real-time information systems such as CitiStat. As one of the most educated and technologically advanced states in the nation, Massachusetts officials and policy elites are likely to appreciate the benefits from information-management tools. The near-passage of a referendum to end the state income tax last year may indicate that voters are impatient with persistent inefficiencies and waste in government.

SIX SIMPLE RULES FOR LAUNCHING CITISTAT

Baltimore offers a good model to bring information-based management to state and local government. But CitiStat is not an off-the-shelf product. It is a system that must be adapted to fit the particular needs and circumstances of the agency. Distributing spreadsheets to departments and scheduling meetings will not change the way that government operates. To succeed, CitiStat requires following six key elements:

1. Commitment begins at the top

In Baltimore, Mayor Martin O'Malley staked his political future on dramatically improving the efficiency and responsiveness of government by using up-to-date information as the ongoing focus for everyday management and longterm policymaking. Mayor O'Malley has built his entire administration around CitiStat. Every policy or management issue is informed by the data and analysis generated by CitiStat. The mayor personally attends about half of the city's six-to-seven weekly CitiStat meetings and makes it clear that his deputy mayor and CitiStat director speak for him in his absence. Regardless of whether he attends CitiStat meetings, the mayor reads every CitiStat summary report produced by his staff. The mayor requires key department officials to build their management practices around CitiStat and he personally holds them responsible for performance based on CitiStat data and reports.

Commitment to CitiStat must be established at the very beginning of the process. When he took office, with a tight city budget, Mayor O'Malley accepted early political heat for spending money on CitiStat while closing firehouses. He made it clear that agency heads had to show up personally to CitiStat meetings and that they would be put on the spot in front of coworkers if they lacked the information about their own operations. Uncooperative departmental heads were replaced. The mayor has used CitiStat as an important proving ground for high-level administrators. CitiStat analysts now direct three agencies or programs in city government: the Recreation and Parks Department, Bureau of Water and Wastewater, and KidStat program.

Commitment to CitiStat must be established at the very beginning of the process. Mayor O'Malley made it clear that agency heads had to show up personally to the CitiStat meetings and that they would be put on the spot in front of their co-workers if they lacked the information about their own operations. Uncooperative departmental heads were replaced

CitiStat requires agencies to buy into the system. Regardless of how they use information, virtually every public agency in state and local government generates data on a wide range of policy and management issues. But in most public agencies, data are held in a number of different places (several electronic and hard-copy files) in different forms (memos, publications, spreadsheets, databases, and so on). The trick of CitiStat is to provide a

comprehensive system, with a simple entry format that city workers can use on a daily basis to input and update information. Everyday data entry, however, will not happen unless city workers' supervisors make it clear to all employees that such work is a central part of the agency's operations. Agency heads must also drive their staff to understand how the data can be used to identify areas for improvement. Public employees need to understand that they must be responsive to the issues raised by CitiStat data.

Programs that avoid redirecting resources or risking political capital will not succeed. Government employees will take the steps to improve their performance – using CitiStat benchmarks, finding innovative ways to improve performance, and exposing embarrassing sources of waste – if it is clear that the rules of the game have changed.

The best time to launch CitiStat is right after a new chief executive takes the reins. A new executive can build his or her whole management structure around CitiStat much easier at the beginning than in the middle of a term. Implementing CitiStat right after an election also gives a mayor or city manager time to show tangible results before the next election.

2. Good analysis requires a dedicated staff

Policy and management analysis is only as good as those who gather, crunch, format, and analyze the data. In Baltimore, each agency generates 10 to 30 pages of spreadsheets every two weeks, depending on the department. For each of the six to seven CitiStat meetings held each week, analysts take the raw data and produce a 10 to 12-page briefing that is delivered to the mayor and first deputy mayor the night before. Without a sophisticated group of analysts, Baltimore officials say, interpretation of data and analysis of issues would be impossible to imagine.

Analysts are assigned to several departments or issue areas. Over time, they become experts on the substance of these issues and the management challenges.

To develop a detailed knowledge of the diverse policy challenges facing the government, the CitiStat staff assigns its analysts each to several departments or issue areas. Over time, these analysts become experts on the substance of these issues as well as the management challenges.

Policy analysts need to earn trust in the departments that they cover. Deputy Mayor Enright explains: "You need people who won't be seen as just interlopers coming to make people work harder. They have to make people comfortable enough to talk about their work."

CitiStat has proven a useful process to identify and develop top management talent for the city. In the program's early days, Baltimore had trouble recruiting skilled and ambitious analysts. In the last year or so, Baltimore City Hall has received hundreds of resumes from top students and policy and management schools as well as managers from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Working in the CitiStat office provides rigorous training in public management and policy evaluation, as well as the particular policy areas of government.

3. Start somewhere

In its full-blown form, CitiStat is a comprehensive database system for management and public policy. Not only does the program involve all major departments in Baltimore city government, but it also coordinates initiatives across departments for many high-priority interests like the care and education of children. But CitiStat started small and grew incrementally over three years.

So what is the best place to start? Identify a visible agency whose mission is core to the priorities of the chief executive. Start gathering information. Baltimore officials met several times with the leaders of departments to determine the appropriate data to collect and analyze.

Officials from the Mayor's Office started by asking department heads for copies of all recent management reports. The two sides met frequently to develop a set of performance measures that could be incorporated into the department's everyday routines. At unannounced site visits, mayoral aides asked what workers in different departments spent their time doing, how they measured their performance, how they spent their money, how they coordinated with other agencies, and so forth. Department heads were asked to identify high- and low-performing front-line employees to determine the range of acceptable performances. The mayor's aides then drafted performance measures and passed them on to the agency for comment; ultimately the Mayor's Office decided which measures were to be used. This whole processes usually lasted only a couple of months before the CitiStat process was begun at the departments.

Department heads were asked to identify high–and low-performing front-line employees to determine the range of acceptable performances. The mayor's aides then drafted performance measures and passed them to the agency for comment.

Departments begin by measuring and analyzing data they already gather. Payroll data offer a wealth of information about overtime, disability, and leave. Most of the savings realized by CitiStat come from reducing overtime and involuntary leave. In their regular meetings with the mayor and his staff, managers must explain why certain employees take so much overtime or why some spend so much time on leave. The Mayor's Office credits CitiStat for $6 million in overtime savings in fiscal year 2001 and almost $10 million more in fiscal year 2002. In addition to financial savings, employees are more efficient if they show up for work and get their job done in the allotted 7.5 hours a day. Managers' explanations for why performance cannot be improved often become productive conversations about how systems can be improved.

Most agencies also track complaints as part of their normal routines. Tracking citizens' complaints, requests, tips, and comments can provide a wealth of information about service levels, employee interactions, and neighborhood conditions and trends. Baltimore's 311 telephone line provides a comprehensive system for gathering this kind of "soft" data.

CitiStat's success in Baltimore resulted, at least in part, from the fact that the mayor did not try to take on all issues at once. Elected on a simple "crime and grime" platform, the mayor

originally focused on departments and indicators that tracked these issues. As City Hall has extended the focus toward youth violence, the Mayor's Office has similarly defined objectives in simple terms and found precise measures for progress. In a context where homicide is the leading cause of death for black teens, the goal is simply to keep children alive and not committing crimes. Youth with more than one arrest in high-risk neighborhoods are identified and the city provides them with a battery of social services.

The measures appropriate for driving public management will differ significantly depending on the agency or community. But every issue has indicators that can be counted. It could be test scores or truancy, traffic volumes or accidents, trash pickups or broken park benches, water usage or building permits, complaints or tickets issued, admissions and waiting periods. The list is endless. It is even possible to track "qualitative" concerns, such as satisfaction with customer service or assessment of the parks or roads most in need of repair. The challenge is to identify a reasonable set of activities or conditions that can be measured, inputted, tracked, and analyzed. Working together, any department at any level of government can devise a data set that can drive management and policy.

4. Get early wins

Improving some services and conditions takes a long time. But in the real world, patience and political will can be in short supply. To build confidence and trust in the whole data-driven management effort, it is important to identify government activities that are visible, easy to understand, and where real improvement is possible. In Baltimore, as in most cities, one of the constant grievances was the time it took the city to fill potholes. Upon discovering that the city filled most potholes within a few days, Mayor O'Malley pushed city workers to reduce the period to two days – and to make a big public splash with a 48-hour pothole guarantee. By prioritizing this task and pushing for improvement within the Department of Transportation, he was able to boast a 95 percent success rate.

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Whatever the issue, it is important to make a high-stakes promise on something tangible that people care about. With a close eye from above, the commitment motivates change. First Deputy Enright sums up the whole CitiStat process simply: "What gets watched, gets done." Persistence also exposes broader inefficiencies that can then be measured and attacked on their own terms. Government agencies ordinarily have trouble making the public aware of their programs, but the drama of even a small but concrete pledge enlists the media to spread the message and to test systems independently.

Small measures can help make gains more visible to the public. Baltimore's "rat rubout" program deployed city workers all over the city, but residents were often unaware when the truck had come to abate the problem. The answer: hang tags on the doorknobs to let residents

know city workers had been on site to address the problem, with information how residents could follow up.

Early wins buoy moral and political will when programs inevitably suffer setbacks. Performance in some issues or areas may deteriorate before it improves, and some agencies resist change. To sustain the determination, visible early wins reinforce the willingness to keep working on the problems identified by CitiStat.

5. Expand and adapt

After experiencing the ups and downs of early efforts, public agencies include more and more aspects of agency operations. The more relevant information an agency collects, and the more intelligently and persistently it uses the information in daily management, the smarter its decisions will be.

Developing a robust set of performance measures is an iterative process. Some measures might turn out to be more effective than others. Baltimore officials became more proficient over time at involving departments in CitiStat and using data in management of City Hall. CitiStat is like learning how to swim: You can only learn it by doing it. The key is to keep learning by trying out different measures. Information that may seem to offer powerful information might turn out to be vague or misleading; likewise, information that may at first seem trivial might turn out to offer powerful insights.

Over time as information within an agency becomes more dependable and analysts become more familiar with how things operate, indicators can be brought closer to actual goals. CitiStat must begin with the tools and information at hand. It might not be obvious how to measure a successful youth program, for example, but it probably matters how many hours a community center is open or how many social workers are assigned to how many cases. In the regular conversations with agencies, it is important to consider how well performance indicators really capture the kind of improvements citizens care about.

It might not be obvious how to measure a successful youth program, but it probably matters how many hours a community center is open or how many social workers are assigned to how many cases.

Procedures should be instituted to ensure the integrity of data. The CitiStat process is only as good as its data. When launching a program that used some features of CitiStat, officials from Chattanooga, Tennessee, also created an independent Audit Advisory Board to examine the accuracy of data. Baltimore assigns one analyst to the field with a digital camera to make surprise visits on city facilities. Each department is required to maintain its own audit functions and CitiStat conducts its own audit. Baltimore's 311 call center also checks 100 cases a week; staffers call citizens who registered complaints to determine residents' satisfaction with services and whether the city's records matched the reality of the situation.

6. Look for horizontal improvements

No department is an island unto itself.

The issues facing one department often affect a number of other departments at the same time. Individual agencies approach problems from the perspective of their own protocols and constraints. CitiStat offers an excellent opportunity for thinking outside these isolated worlds of everyday service delivery.

Representatives from several agencies are present for the CitiStat meetings. Next to the mayor and the first deputy mayor normally sit the finance director, chief information officer, labor commissioner, city solicitor, director of human relations, and director of CitiStat. CitiStat analysts present at the meetings have knowledge of how other departments might collaborate on tasks. By pressing trash-collecting departments about why garbage was still on the streets, for instance, Baltimore officials discovered that they had a problem with illegal dumping. The Department of Public Works lacked the power to arrest violators but it could provide information about where and when dumping occurs. As a result the Police Department assigned a special unit and the 911 response protocols were changed to respond more quickly to dumping complaints.

When issues require ongoing coordination between agencies, the city has formed new "stat" groups to track progress and solve problems. The Mayor's Office found that problems with juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, and project planning required persistent coordination between departments. To address these problems, the Mayor's Office created KidStat, DrugStat, and ProjectStat groups.

By pressing trash-collecting departments about why garbage was still on the streets, Baltimore officials discovered that they had a problem with illegal dumping. The Police Department assigned a special unit to respond to dumping complaints

Another issue that underscores the need to coordinate simple management challenges is lead poisoning. Not a single enforcement action had been taken in the 10 years prior to CitiStat. The Mayor formed a "LeadStat" team with officials from health, housing, and environmental agencies. They created a map of the city with red dots for each case of lead poisoning and met twice-monthly to find solutions for turning these contaminated properties into green dots for abated ones. Health and housing inspectors trained together.

Environmental officials were employed by the state rather than the city, but responded to the structure and peer pressure provided by CitiStat. More than 1,000 sites have since been abated and there are far more green dots than red ones on the map. More importantly, the rate of lead poisoning among children in Baltimore fell 36 percent, with cases of children seriously poisoned down 61 percent.

When agencies attempt to shunt responsibilities onto others, CitiStat offers an opportunity to clarify overlapping areas of jurisdiction and improve services. In one case, Baltimore officials found that two agencies both had responsibility for abandoned cars,

depending on where the car was located. If one wheel was on an alley and the other wheels were in the street then both agencies claimed it was the other's responsibility. Clarifying jurisdiction served residents better and saved the time wasted sending requests back and forth between agencies. Similar confusion over jurisdiction arose over dead animals, which were the responsibility of four different agencies depending on the type of animal, location, and time of day. Trucks would drive out to discover that a raccoon was actually a cat and return to send the request to another agency—a caricature of waste. Eventually CitiStat gave responsibility for disposing of all dead animals to the Department of Public Health; the agency's budget was increased accordingly.



From a September 8, 2000 CitiStat meeting

Greater efficiency comes from the relentless pursuit of seemingly minor problems. Individual departments may only be concerned with whether they are following protocol. Only an outside body – concerned with overall performance and empowered to pursue individual instances – can unravel and change entrenched wasteful practices.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

A number of questions arise regularly about the structure and operation of CitiStat. A sampler:

What if we don't have the extra money?

CitiStat requires initial startup costs and requires hiring a skilled staff. But Baltimore found the savings from the program far exceed the costs. In FY2001, for instance, the Mayor's office estimates that the city's total start-up and operating costs for CitiStat were approximately $285,000 with realized savings of $13.2 million – a return on investment of over 45 to 1. These numbers do not capture the value of improved municipal services.

In a tight budget situation, many public officials are wary of investing in an initiative that may be perceived as an "extra" program. But waiting for the "perfect time" to launch the program – waiting for city revenues to increase or relying on outside funding – could cause harmful delays. Investing in CitiStat when resources are scarce signals the leadership's commitment to seeing it through.

We have a city manager system of government.

An established city manager may see CitiStat as usurping some of his or her authority. That does not mean that CitiStat would not fit in a manger form of government. When the city or town council hires a new city manager, the contract might require the implementation of a CitiStat-type program. In the meantime, councilors interested in improved data and performance can ask a resistant manager to produce some basic information about operations. How many vehicles does the city have in its fleet? How are those vehicles deployed? What are the trends for overtime? Managers do not want to be told how to run their offices, but they might be persuaded to adopt an information-based management system. Such a system could enhance their understanding of the far-flung operations of local government.

Is this a software package?

No. Computers offer tremendous power to sort, retrieve, and format information, but the system is as only as good as the people and information involved. Jane Fountain, director of the National Center on Digital Governance at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School, notes: "CitiStat is technology-enabled, but only in ways where the technology itself is already widespread. It is important that we have the capability for any department to enter information once and it become part of a larger system. It is important that information be available in more-or-less real time. But ultimately, CitiStat is not about the technology."

CitiStat is technology-enabled, but only in ways where the technology itself is already widespread.

The larger goal of CitiStat lies beyond technology. CitiStat seeks to uproot systems of *patronage politics* (based on the exchange of favors), and even to displace ordinary *process politics* (in which government workers view success in terms of following prescribed protocols). In their places, management tools like CitiStat can contribute to a *performance-based politics* in which government agencies define success in terms of the outcomes residents care about. "CitiStat is," according to Robert Behn, faculty chair of the Kennedy School's executive-education program on Driving Government Performance, "part of a broader management strategy of directly engaging departments and their staff to get them to focus on what really counts."

What do public sector unions think about this?

Public-sector unions often approach performance-based management systems with suspicion. Unions fear that relentless tracking of performance can be used as a wedge to downsize government and outsource tasks where public agencies have been found deficient to private vendors.

The devil is in the details. Public agencies typically advance a wide variety of policy goals

besides simply delivering services. Many agencies are required to pay higher-than-minimum wages, use recycled paper, or contract with minority- or women-owned companies, for instance. If private firms' performance is measured in simple bottom-line terms that exclude other public policy goals, then performance-based systems could set up public agencies for failure.

CitiStat Director Matthew Gallagher states that CitiStat is not about running government like a business. "Our modification on that axiom, is that government should be run in a more business-like way. Truth-be-told," he continues, " there are just too many things that governments (particularly local ones) have to do that the private sector has little to no interest in." Regardless of whether the public or private sector delivers a service, it is important to track performance. It is telling that in Baltimore one benchmark that has been closely tracked across agencies is the percentage of contracts going to minority-owned businesses.

'CitiStat is not about running government like a business. It is about running government in a more businesslike way.' CitiStat Director Matthew Gallagher

Following the path of former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, Baltimore has established a process of "managed competition" for many kinds of service delivery. Both public and private entities are invited to bid for the services. The impact of subcontracting on public employees has been minimal. Of the 250 employees whose work was taken over by private firms, all but 15 to 20 of them have been assigned to other agencies or retrained within city government. City officials claim that the services that have been subcontracted – such as custodial services and grass cutting – have gone to local mom-and-pop businesses rather than large companies.

Labor unions in Baltimore did not support the mayor's first campaign but supported his subsequent election. They have been neither strongly supportive nor resistant of CitiStat. Top city officials say that unions have been brought in regularly for advice in improving efficiency. Organized labor has little basis to object to CitiStat so long as employees are only asked to show up and perform their jobs. Workers also appreciate when good performance gets recognized.

Insofar as CitiStat helps to improve the image of government, it makes voters and higher levels of government less inclined to cut the government programs where union workers are employed. City Hall has dramatically improved its relations with state officials and legislators. When key budget officials from the state capitol in Annapolis attend CitiStat meetings, they tend to be more confident about how state monies are spent in the city.

It can't be done here.

CitiStat is not a template. In Baltimore each new agency began with its own baby steps. According to Deputy Mayor Michael Enright: "We have to reinvent the process with every department, start the same way we initially did with trash." Adjusting to unique conditions of an agency or city is part of the initial start-up process.

Do city counselors and alderman dislike losing their ombudsman role?

They may worry that CitiStat will make them obsolete. In Baltimore the mayor's office has reassured them by creating a direct system for filing and checking on citizen requests for assistance with the city bureaucracy. Councilors can still take public credit for pushing the Mayor's Office to respond to citizen requests. City officials often place a higher priority on requests from councilors.

What about the 311 call center? Do we need that first?

Baltimore officials do not recommend launching a call center first. The danger is that the government agency will increase the volume of citizen requests and complaints without the capacity to deal with those issues on the back end. Deputy Mayor Enright notes, however, that seeing the high rates of failure to abate citizen requests would certainly help motivate subsequent reforms.

The call-in center has become an important part of CitiStat and has helped change the image of public responsiveness.

A centralized call center is much more expensive than the basic CitiStat operations. The service in Baltimore costs $4 million annually, though it may save money by consolidating other call services.

The call-in center has become a critical part of CitiStat. A representative from the 311 program sits in on CitiStat meetings and can help to alter the kinds of questions that residents are asked for better information, or the kinds of responses so that expectations will not be unreasonable. Citizen requests also provide an important source of information about departmental performance and unmet needs.

According to Baltimore officials, the 311 system has been very popular with constituents. Citizens historically have experienced great frustration trying to report problems to City Hall. A professional operator with a modern computer database dramatically changes the image of public responsiveness. Even the greater levels of courtesy displayed by operators makes a big difference.

Here is how the system works. Each call generates a service request number and is assigned to a specific agency. Each agency that has to address the issue is required to sign off on the citizen's requests or complaints. Residents can also make requests online. Callers can inquire later about what happened to their requests.

We need someone to come in and show us how to do this.

The city of Baltimore has put together a CD-ROM that includes the non-proprietary elements of the technical package for other government agencies to adapt. Baltimore officials have consulted with officials from other cities and continue to be willing to do so. But the expert knowledge on how to implement CitiStat can only be gained by initiating the process. CitiStat is a learning-by-doing system that requires political will to succeed.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Baltimore's pioneering use of CitiStat is the result of two converging forces –the availability of inexpensive technology and the shift toward basic service delivery in city government.

Virtually every desk worker in city government today uses a computer with power greater than all of the machinery used to put a man on the moon just a generation ago. Even sophisticated database programs use little of the memory on desktop computers. Mapping software and photographs and other graphics take more space on a computer's memory – but even those images can easily be stored on compact disks for easy retrieval. There is no real reason why even the most poorly funded city agency cannot track a wide range of information for use in analyzing performance and trends and achieving efficiencies in management.

In the midst of the information revolution, cities have experienced a significant political revolution. Mayors in the 1960s developed a wide range of redistributive policies on issues such as housing, job training, legal services, higher education, nutrition, contracting, small business development, and neighborhood development. Prominent mayors like John V. Lindsay of New York and Maynard Jackson of Atlanta developed programs to create new opportunities in poor communities. This redistributive approach shifted toward development in the 1980s. Mayors like Edward I. Koch of New York, Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco, Andrew Young of Atlanta, and Federico Pena of Denver sought to encourage new economic activity on the grounds that the best social program is a job.

The redistributive and developmental impulses remain in city politics. But in recent years, mayors have embraced a more modest goal of allocating basic services more efficiently and professionally. The thinking is simple. If the city government can achieve excellence in its own affairs, it can create a better environment for working-class families, small businesses, and the full range of city dwellers and workers. The City Hall leaders of this service-delivery emphasis include Rudolph Giuliani of New York, Thomas Menino of Boston, and Richard Daley of Chicago.

Virtually every desk worker in city government today uses a computer with power greater than all of the machinery used to put a man on the moon just a generation ago.

CitiStat is primarily a tool to help the city government tend to its own business of delivering basic services. But it could also play an important role in better assessing all manner of urban issues. What kinds of businesses offer the greatest potential for reviving inner-city neighborhoods? What kinds of workers are most in demand? What kinds of housing are needed to shelter workers at all rungs of the housing ladder?

Whatever the kind of policy – redistributive, developmental, or allocative – CitiStat presents a powerful model of the importance of information in today's city. If information is power, then broad and open use of information is democratic power.

APPENDIX ONE: EXCERPT FROM CITISTAT TRANSPORTATION REPORT

Volume 1 Number 17

DPW- TRANSPORTATION

REPORTING PERIOD: MARCH 31, 2001 THROUGH APRIL 13, 2001

Bureau Head: MICHAEL RICE

Date Appoint: Acting

Division Chief (Engineering) : Fred Mare
Division Chief (Maintenance): Anthony P. Wallnofer
Division Chief (Construction Management): Dan Rocks
Division Chief (Safety): Col. J. Anthony Jeffrey

PERSONNEL	FY2001 BUDGET	FY2001 FILLED	FY2000 BUDGET	% Change
ADMINISTRATION	32	26	32	
ENGINEERING	161	137	170	
MAINTENANCE	838	757	867	
CONSTR. MGMT	107	89	114	
SAFETY	572	515	585	
TOTAL	1,710	1,524	1,768	
SEASONAL		102		
LOAN TO BUREAU		20		
LOAN FROM BUREAU		(53)		
TOTAL		1593		

ANNUAL BUDGET	FY2001	EXP TO DATE	%
ADMINISTRATION	$7,683,049	$2,697,434	35%
ENGINEERING	$5,576,450	$4,812,156	86%
MAINTENANCE	$59,393,506	$40,726,089	69%
CONSTR. MGMT*	$63,311	$605,284	0%
SAFETY	$13,509,629	$9,927,459	73%
*100% Reimbursement By Capital			
OVERTIME	$1,918,510	$2,032,846	106%
Expenditures to date as of 2/28/01			

PERSONNEL DATA

	2-WEEK PAY PERIOD					ANNUAL				
	2/17-3/2	3/3-3/16	3/17-3/30	3/31-4/13	% CHANGE	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Total	Periods
OVERTIME (HOURS)	6,644.4	2,507.6	2,623.6	3,226.4	23.0%	5,249	2,508	13,527	89,230	17
Administration	18.5	5.0	0.0	0.0	#DIV/0!	10	-	42	166	17
Engineering	406.5	282.0	315.0	212.0	-32.7%	352	89	690	5,991	17
Maintenance	5,308.5	1,344.0	1,216.5	2,221.0	82.6%	3,514	1,111	10,912	59,731	17
Constr. Mgmt	229.0	55.0	81.5	41.5	-49.1%	249	42	510	4,237	17
Safety	681.9	821.6	1,010.6	751.9	-25.6%	1,124	575	2,206	19,105	17
UNSCHEDULED LEAVE	354.5	298.0	226.5	232.5	2.6%	385	227	565	6,546	17
Administration	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	#DIV/0!	0	-	1	1	17
Engineering	32.0	31.0	18.5	17.0	-8.1%	20	4	48	340	17
Maintenance	210.0	186.5	129.5	145.0	12.0%	242	130	369	4,120	17
Constr. Mgmt	0.0	12.0	10.0	6.0	-40.0%	10	-	28	162	17
Safety	111.5	68.5	68.5	64.5	-5.8%	113	65	213	1,924	17
"A" TIME(MAN-DAYS)	266.0	260.5	242.6	234.5	-3.3%	315	203	537	5,358	17
Administration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	#DIV/0!	-	-	-	-	17
Engineering	0.0	0.0	4.0	11.0	175.0%	6	-	13	98	17
Maintenance	193.5	189.5	169.0	166.5	-1.5%	252	167	425	4,285	17
Constr. Mgmt	9.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	0.0%	2	-	10	40	17
Safety	63.5	66.0	66.6	54.0	-18.9%	55	25	112	935	17
LIGHT DUTY (MANDAYS	245.5	276.0	283.5	252.0	-11.1%	297	182	631	5,051	17
Administration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	#DIV/0!	-	-	-	-	17
Engineering	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	#DIV/0!	-	-	-	-	17
Maintenance	187.0	211.0	216.5	185.5	-14.3%	231	120	567	3,933	17
Constr. Mgmt	9.0	10.0	12.0	15.0	25.0%	7	-	15	124	17
Safety	49.5	55.0	55.0	51.5	-6.4%	58	50	65	994	17

Cover page from a Department of Transportation report from March 31 to April 13, 2001. The first page of most CitiStat reports focuses on attendance and overtime hours.

CITISTAT

Employee Absentee Worksheet

REPORTING PERIOD: MARCH 31, 2001 THROUGH APRIL 13, 2001

	EMPLOYEES	REQUIRED WORK-DAYS	PRE-APP SICK	NON-SCHED SICK	SICK BANK	SICK X	X-TIME (UNAP-PROVED)	ACCIDENT TIME	PERMISS.	VACATION	PERSONAL LEAVE	COMP TIME	FAMILY LEAVE	X-PERMISS	TOTAL
Administration	9	81	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
Engineering	138	1,236	11.0	14.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	11.0	5.0	74.4	13.0	6.5	0.0	5.0	142.9
Maintenance	736	6,624	165.5	103.0	25.0	15.0	23.0	148.5	31.5	280.0	61.5	69.0	0.0	60.0	982.0
Maint. Seasonal	66	594	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	18.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	33.0
Constr. Mgmt	90	810	8.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	6.0	52.5	9.0	1.5	0.0	1.0	87.0
Safety	554	4,826	106.0	45.0	0.0	12.0	7.5	54.0	25.5	91.0	34.5	47.5	0.0	3.0	426.0
TOTALS	1,593	14,171	290.5	167.0	25.0	32.0	33.5	234.5	70.0	498.3	118.7	124.5	0.0	80.0	1,673.9

REPORTING PERIOD: MARCH 17, 2001 THROUGH MARCH 30, 2001

	EMPLOYEES	REQUIRED WORK-DAYS	PRE-APP SICK	NON-SCHED SICK	SICK BANK	SICK X	X-TIME (UNAP-PROVED)	ACCIDENT TIME	PERMISS.	VACATION	PERSONAL LEAVE	COMP TIME	FAMILY LEAVE	X-PERMISS	TOTAL
Administration	9	90	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5
Engineering	139	1,382	15.0	8.5	0.0	8.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	39.9	10.0	6.2	1.0	2.0	97.6
Maintenance	737	7,370	154.0	96.5	23.0	26.0	7.0	169.0	41.0	418.5	66.5	69.5	0.0	57.5	1,128.5
Maint. Seasonal	60	600	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.5	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.5	56.0
Constr. Mgmt	90	900	5.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	3.0	8.0	39.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	71.0
Safety	554	5,380	170.0	34.0	1.0	20.0	12.6	55.0	51.0	68.5	68.0	47.0	20.0	5.0	552.1
TOTALS	1,589	15,722	345.0	145.0	24.0	57.0	30.1	259.0	101.0	569.4	151.5	122.7	21.0	85.0	1,910.7

CHANGES SINCE LAST PERIOD

	EMPLOYEES	REQUIRED WORK-DAYS	PRE-APP SICK	NON-SCHED SICK	SICK BANK	SICK X	X-TIME (UNAP-PROVED)	ACCIDENT TIME	PERMISS.	VACATION	PERSONAL LEAVE	COMP TIME	FAMILY LEAVE	X-PERMISS	TOTAL
Administration	-	(10.0%)	(100.0%)	-	-	-	-	-		(90.0%)	(35.0%)	-	-	-	(45.5%)
Engineering	(0.7%)	(10.6%)	(26.7%)	64.7%	-	(62.5%)	(100.0%)	175.0%	400.0%	86.5%	30.0%	4.8%	(100.0%)	150.0%	46.4%
Maintenance	(0.1%)	(10.1%)	7.5%	6.7%	8.7%	(42.3%)	228.6%	(12.1%)	(23.2%)	(33.1%)	(7.5%)	(0.7%)	-	4.3%	(13.0%)
Maint. Seasonal	10.0%	(1.0%)	-	-	-	(33.3%)	(55.6%)	(35.7%)	-	-	-	-	-	(46.3%)	(41.1%)
Constr. Mgmt	-	(10.0%)	60.0%	(16.7%)	-	-	(75.0%)	-	(25.0%)	34.6%	50.0%		-		22.5%
Safety	-	(10.3%)	(37.6%)	32.4%	(100.0%)	(40.0%)	(40.5%)	(1.8%)	(50.0%)	32.8%	(49.3%)	1.1%	(100.0%)	(40.0%)	(22.8%)
TOTALS	0.3%	(9.9%)	(15.8%)	15.2%	4.2%	(43.9%)	11.3%	(9.5%)	(30.7%)	(12.5%)	(21.7%)	1.5%	(100.0%)	(5.9%)	(12.4%)

Continuation of transportation report containing information on absenteeism for the Department of Transportation.

Volume I Number 17

DPW - TRANSPORTATION

CITISTAT

TRANSPORTATION MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE

REPORTING PERIOD: MARCH 31, 2001 THROUGH APRIL 13, 2001

CREW PERFORMANCE

	3/17-3/30			3/31-4/13		
Sector	# Complaints	# Abated w/in 48 hrs	Abatement %	# Complaints	# Abated w/in 48 hrs	Abatement %
One	119	119	100%	54	54	100%
Two	230	222	97%	92	92	100%
Three	125	124	99%	73	73	100%
Four	73	73	100%	31	30	97%
Totals	547	538	98%	250	249	100%

	3/17-3/30				3/31-4/13			
Sector	# of Crews	Crew Days	Pot Holes Filled	Daily Average	# of Crews	Crew Days	Pot Holes Filled	Daily Average
One	2	16	508	32	2	16	794	50
Two	3	30	1,031	34	3	27	1,463	54
Three	2	20	1,224	61	1	9	643	71
Four	3	30	1,745	58	3	27	1,016	38
Totals	10	96	4,508	47	9	79	3916	50

POTHOLE COMPLAINT ABATEMENT RATE

	Two Week Reporting Periods					ANNUAL				
	2/17-3/2	3/3-3/16	3/17-3/30	3/31-4/13	% CHANGE	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Total	Periods
Sector										
One	92%	96%	100%	100%	0.0%	92.5%	65.3%	100.0%	NA	14
Two	93%	91%	97%	100%	3.1%	89.2%	45.3%	100.0%	NA	14
Three	95%	100%	99%	100%	1.0%	89.7%	35.0%	100.0%	NA	14
Four	80%	80%	100%	97%	-3.0%	88.3%	40.0%	100.0%	NA	14
Totals	92%	94%	98%	100%	2.0%	90.1%	50.0%	100.0%	NA	14

POTHOLES FILLED - DAILY AVERAGE

	Two Week Reporting Periods					ANNUAL				
	2/17-3/2	3/3-3/16	3/17-3/30	3/31-4/13	% CHANGE	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Total	Periods
Sector										
One	101	52	32	50	56.3%	40.3	13.4	101.0	NA	14
Two	93	77	34	54	58.8%	61.0	17.5	93.0	NA	14
Three	54	34	61	71	16.4%	46.1	8.5	85.0	NA	14
Four	47	51	58	38	-34.5%	37.2	12.5	67.0	NA	14
Totals	75	53	47	50	6.4%	46.2	13.3	75.0	NA	14

* Data for this period is per man

Page from transportation report listing potholes filled in each sector of the city of Baltimore.

Appendix Two:
Map from CitiStat Parks and Recreation Report



APPENDIX THREE:
EXCERPT FROM CITISTAT HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REPORT

BCHD

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
REPORTING PERIOD: JULY 3, 2003 THROUGH JULY 16, 2003

				FY 2004			
Obj: Health care for all	**FY2001**	**FY2002**	**FY2003**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**FY to Date**	**FY Target**
Number of MCHIP/Medicaid Applications for Children received by BCHA	22,275	25,204	29,290	1,029	991	991	26,000
Number of MCHP/Medicaid Applications for Pregnant Women received by BCHA	3,765	4,439	4,777	200	153	153	4,750

				FY 2004			
Obj: Reduce substance abuse	**FY2001**	**FY2002**	**FY2003**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**FY to Date+G13**	**FY Target**
Number of addicts in treatment: Methadone	6,373	7,563	7,989	6,022	6,027	6,027	7,025
Residential	2,603	2,261	2,091	265	273	273	3,000
Outpatient	9,526	11,667	12,104	5,576	5,568	5,568	8,010
Detoxification	1,056	783	2,306	530	460	460	2,000
Number of treatment slots: Methadone	4,553	4,553	4,553	4,553	4,553	4,553	4,681
Residential	379	379	379	379	379	379	698
Outpatient	2,239	2,239	2,239	2,239	2,239	2,239	2,670
Detoxification	249	249	249	249	249	249	271
% clients active in Methadone after 6 months (quarterly)	67%	75%	FY03 - 76%		Q1 FY03 - 76%		70%
% clients active in Drug-Free Outpatient after 3 months (Quarterly)	57%	58%	FY03 - 67%		Q1 FY03 - 67%		55%
Average length of stay in methadone (Qtr)	587 days	789 days	- 807 days		Q1 FY03 - 807 days		550 days
Average length of stay in adult drug-free outpatient	126 days	128 days	- 184 days		Q1 FY03 - 184 days		180 days
Average length of stay in youth outpatient (Qtr)	158 days	137 days	- 200 days		Q1 FY03 - 200 days		180 days
detoxification (Qtr)	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days	7 days
Average length of stay in intermediate care facility (Qtr)	21 days	21 days	21 days	21 days	21 days	21 days	24 days
Average time on waiting list for persons admitted to methadone	25 days	24 days	21 days	27 days	27 days	27 days	20 days

Excerpt from a Department of Health CitiStat report from July 3, 2003 to July 16, 2003 detailing Department of Health performance indicators for Fiscal Year 2004.

BCHD

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
REPORTING PERIOD: JULY 3, 2003 THROUGH JULY 16, 2003

Obj: Reduce Hepatitis, STD, and TB Incidence				FY 2004			
STD Clinic Volume Indicators	**FY2001**	**FY2002**	**FY2003**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**FY to date**	**FY Target**
Number of patients seen at STD clinics	17,581	25,388	24, 846	800	1,142	1,142	25,000
Number of total visits to STD clinics	31,351	29,001	28, 401	676	1,293	1,293	30,000
Testing Indicators	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**CY to date**	**CY Target**
# of positive syphilis tests at clinics	99	66	35	1	9	34	N/A
# of positive syphilis tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	72	0	0	9	N/A
# of positive gonorrhea tests at clinics	2,169	1,688	1,848	70	44	726	N/A
# of positive gonorrhea tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	5	0	0	3	N/A
# of positive chlamydia tests at clinics	546	625	695	27	23	335	N/A
# of positive chlamydia tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	32	1	0	5	N/A
# of current suspect TB cases from Chest clinic	N/A	N/A	N/A	11	11	N/A	N/A
# of TB cases from Chest clinic	62	60	71	0	1	19	N/A
# of contacts to pulmonary cases	Not available	Not available	Not available	37	28	28	Not available
# of contacts on direct observed preventive treatment (DOPT)	Not available	Not available	Not available	7	7	7	Not available
City-Wide Statistics	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**CY to date**	**CY Target**
Number of Syphilis (primary and secondary) cases	217	155	122	7	9	70	N/A
Number of Gonorrhea cases	5,338	4,958	4853	198	154	2,242	N/A
Number of Chlamydia cases	4,945	5,375	6291	286	217	3,542	N/A
Number of Hepatitis A cases	92	92	68	0	5	24	N/A
Number of Hepatitis B cases	743	1260	1151	35	57	641	N/A
Number of Hepatitis C cases	875	2046	5100	133	115	2,333	N/A
Number of Tuberculosis cases	62	60	available	0	1	19	N/A
AIDS Data	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**Feb-03**	**Feb-03**	**CY to date~**	**CY Target**
# of AIDS diagnoses	688	755	565	N/A	N/A	12	N/A
# of AIDS deaths	131	125	51	N/A	N/A	1	N/A

* Druid STD Clinic is not reporting data due to a software problem. (4/24 - 6/18); a consultant is working with MIS staff to resolve the problem.

~AIDS cases and deaths are current through 3/3/03.

~~ The STD results from Ujima testing activities have been confirmed.

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
REPORTING PERIOD: JULY 3, 2003 THROUGH JULY 16, 2003

Obj: Reduce Hepatitis, STD, and TB incidence				FY 2004			
STD Clinic Volume Indicators	**FY2001**	**FY2002**	**FY2003**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**FY to date**	**FY Target**
Number of patients seen at STD clinics	17,581	25,388	24, 846	800	1,142	1,142	25,000
Number of total visits to STD clinics	31,351	29,001	28, 401	676	1,293	1,293	30,000
Testing Indicators	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**CY to date**	**CY Target**
# of positive syphilis tests at clinics	99	66	35	1	9	34	N/A
# of positive syphilis tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	72	0	0	9	N/A
# of positive gonorrhea tests at clinics	2,169	1,688	1,848	70	44	726	N/A
# of positive gonorrhea tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	5	0	0	3	N/A
# of positive chlamydia tests at clinics	546	625	695	27	23	335	N/A
# of positive chlamydia tests from Ujima	N/A	N/A	32	1	0	5	N/A
# of current suspect TB cases from Chest clinic	N/A	N/A	N/A	11	11	N/A	N/A
# of TB cases from Chest clinic	62	60	71	0	1	19	N/A
# of contacts to pulmonary cases	Not available	Not available	Not available	37	28	28	Not available
# of contacts on direct observed preventive treatment (DOPT)	Not available	Not available	Not available	7	7	7	Not available
City-Wide Statistics	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**6/19-7/2**	**7/3-7/16**	**CY to date**	**CY Target**
Number of Syphilis (primary and secondary) cases	217	155	122	7	9	70	N/A
Number of Gonorrhea cases	5,338	4,958	4853	198	154	2,242	N/A
Number of Chlamydia cases	4,945	5,375	6291	286	217	3,542	N/A
Number of Hepatitis A cases	92	92	68	0	5	24	N/A
Number of Hepatitis B cases	743	1260	1151	35	57	641	N/A
Number of Hepatitis C cases	875	2046	5100	133	115	2,333	N/A
Number of Tuberculosis cases	62	60	available	0	1	19	N/A
AIDS Data	**CY2000**	**CY2001**	**CY2002**	**Feb-03**	**Feb-03**	**CY to date~**	**CY Target**
# of AIDS diagnoses	688	755	565	N/A	N/A	12	N/A
# of AIDS deaths	131	125	51	N/A	N/A	1	N/A

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The Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, based at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, works to improve the policy and governance in the Greater Boston area by contributing useful and academically rigorous research to inform policy debates, engaging students in public service, strengthening networks of academics and practitioners involved in public policy work, promoting dialogue on policy matters in forums and on the web, and providing training for municipal officials in the Greater Boston area.

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