Executive Director Daughtry called the Focus Group to order at 8:30 AM. After explaining the reason for the meeting and introducing the attendees, he turned the meeting over to Chairperson Monier for opening remarks. Chairperson Monier gave a brief history of CALEA and went on to describe the procedures CALEA follows in establishing, reviewing and updating its law enforcement and public safety communications standards.

Next, the following four case studies were presented focusing on the role of Crisis Management and Critical Incident Command (IC):

• Murrah Building Bombing – Sam Gonzales, former Police Chief, Oklahoma City, OK
• Pentagon Bombing – Deputy Chief Steven Holl, Arlington County (VA) Police Dept., Asst. Chief James Schwartz, Arlington County (VA) Fire Dept.
• World Trade Towers – Dir. Robert Greenlaw, Northwest Bergen Central Dispatch Center
• Columbine – Commissioner Patrick Sullivan, Sheriff, Arapahoe County (CO)

The group then went on to review the pertinent chapters/standards in CALEA’s 4th Edition for Law Enforcement Agencies and 1st Edition for Public Safety Communications Agencies.  As a result of the presentations and review of standards, a number of general observations were made, followed by specific suggestions regarding CALEA standards.

General Observations

• There is a need to establish clearly defined relationships with all potential incident responders before the incident. Attendees encouraged the use of more "table-tops" and joint exercises between agencies.  It was suggested that IC systems include all of the agencies that might have a need to be present on an "unusual occurrence" scene. These could include, but not be limited to, the Fire Department, EMS, utility companies, federal/state agencies and individuals who work with private agencies who may be able to provide assistance.
• A plan must be developed for establishing both outer and inner perimeters. A procedure must be established that delineates exactly who will have access to the incident site. It was generally agreed upon that only those persons who had legitimate need to be there to enter the incident scene. An access control system could include ID bands, badges, colored vests and/or credentialing. Entry and exposure logs should be kept. Emergency travel routes must be kept open.
• Coordination/compatibility of equipment, especially communications, is absolutely necessary.
• Ideally, IC systems should be used for all incidents, not just the "big ones."
• Relationships with the medical community should be established in advance.
• In critical incidents, those persons who respond are sometimes emotionally affected. Consideration should be given by responding agencies to including mental health, medical, and other social service personnel who can provide the necessary assistance to those responders needing it.  IC should also deal with mental health issues with regard to the victims' families as well as both the responders and their families. The role of the agencies' EAPs should be communicated to the public safety personnel affected.  
• A clear understanding of media issues must be developed. Who releases what? The timeliness and accuracy of the information is very important. Plans should be made earlier on in the incident to include the media. Question need to be addressed such as when to allow them on the scene and what information is given. In addition, it could be beneficial if those on the scene providing assistance know what information the media is broadcasting to the public.
• Equally important as providing the necessary protective equipment is training in its use and periodic reviews regarding operational readiness.  Standards should be developed to instruct those persons on the scene as to what type of equipment should be used and that the requisite training be given to those persons. 
• Is there a need for a "hazard analyses and/or threat assessments" as part of a community planning process?  Should alert stages be defined?  (An example of such an analysis is attached: "Domestic Terrorism Plan: Response Level Matrix" developed by Washington area law enforcement agencies)
• There is a very real need to draw a distinction between the classic "barricade situation" and an incident involving an "active assault."
• Agencies should have a system in place that allows the sharing of criminal intelligence with other concerned agencies in a timely manner.  Sharing criminal intelligence has often proven to be critical to the successful handling of incidents of this type.
• IC should establish control of requested and non-requested volunteers. This procedure would also apply to physical items of assistance and donations such as secondary equipment, tools, food, water, and toilets.
• How do/should agencies respond to the "highest state of alert" warnings from the President, Homeland Security Director or FBI?

Specific Standard Changes

Specific standard changes were divided into two groups. The first group, those dealing with 4th Edition Chapter 46, Unusual Occurrences and Special Operations, were to be dealt with as soon as possible. The second group of suggested changes could await action until the time of the normal review of the 4th Edition in preparation for developing the 5th Edition.

Chapter 46 - Unusual Occurrences and Special Operations

• It was suggested that a new language be added to Standard 46.1.2 requiring that agencies which have a written plan for responding to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, etc. be required to hold annual exercises to test these plans.  These exercises could be "table-top", functional or full-scale mock drills.
• Is there a need, in Chapter 46, to require functional exercises?
• Should the phrase "updated as needed" be replaced by "periodically"?
  • It was recommended that definitions for "Incident Management System" and "Exercise" be added to the 4th Edition glossary.
  • It was suggested that 4th Edition Standard 46.1.2 be replaced with the 3rd Edition version of the same standard.

4th Edition

46.1.2 The agency has written plan for responding to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and other unusual occurrences.

Commentary:  Thorough planning is a fundamental requirement in responding to unusual occurrences outlined in this standard. Agencies responding to unusual occurrences should prepare for a variety of needs, including, but not limited to: provisions for communications, situation maps, field command posts, chain of command to include other agencies, casualty information, community relations, (public information-media briefings), other agency support, military support, martial law, public facility security, traffic control, equipment availability, de-escalation procedures, post-occurrence duties, after-action reports, transportation, court/prosecutorial liaison and other legal considerations. Of particular importance is the unified command of personnel from other agencies assisting in unusual occurrences. When appropriate, unit integrity of individual agency personnel should be maintained throughout mission assignments.

City, county, regional, and state plans should be utilized where appropriate. Existing or other mandated plans which fail to address the specifics of this standard should be supplemented by agency policy, procedures, or plan. (MMMM)

3rd Edition (modified)

46.1.2   The agency has a written plan for responding to natural and man-made disasters and includes provisions for:

• communications   
• situation maps
• field command posts
•  chain of command (to include other agencies)
•  casualty information
• community relations/public information (media briefings)
• other agency support; assignments
• military support (martial law)
• public facility security
• traffic control
• equipment requirements
• de-escalation procedures
• rumor control
• post-occurrence (aftermath) duties
• after-action reports; and
• transportation

Commentary: Thorough planning is a fundamental requirement in responding to natural and man-made disasters. Of particular importance is the unified command of personnel from other agencies responding to the unusual occurrence. When appropriate, unit integrity of individual agency personnel should be maintained throughout mission assignments. In implementing these plans, agencies are referred to Standard 46.1.11. (M M M M)

As a result of the Focus Group meeting, CALEA staff is suggesting a new Standard 46.1.11 - Incident Command Systems: 

46.1.11 The agency uses an Incident Command System and addresses the following:

• Compatibility with similar systems used by other public safety agencies the agency may likely be involved with
• Written directives
• Training of agency personnel
• Documented use
• Documented annual training exercises; and
• Documented annual evaluation of incidents and training effectiveness

Commentary: The expanding scope and sophistication of emergency operations, along with increased possibilities of acts of terrorism require law enforcement agencies to quickly act to stabilize and control emergency situations. Increasingly, law enforcement agencies must deal with large catastrophes with no notice.  Immediate and decisive action is required to minimize loss of life, reduce property damage and permit involved authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. 

The incident command system (ICS) has proven very effective in federal and fire services emergencies over the past two decades. This system permits a clear point of control and can be expanded or contracted with ease to escalating or diminishing situations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ICS is comprehensive, available on the web, and widely used. An agency may chose a different model but must ensure it accomplishes the intent of ICS and that any system used is readily adaptable to systems other agencies may use in important areas i.e. terminology, modular organization, integrated communications, and unity of command. The Incident Command System will not be effective if training is not provided or if it not used. 

While the law enforcement mission is often handled with few officers, there are situations that quickly escalate into major incidents. It is important to work with other agencies that use this system, so when crises arise, all personnel are familiar with the ICS structure and can function effectively within it. This standard does not require the use of ICS with minor instances handled solely by the agency. Additionally, not all components of ICS need to be activated when the system is operational, only those that are needed in the situation should be used. Component activation and deactivation depends upon changing circumstances.

Training should include tabletop, actual exercises, multiple agency involvement, and may be in conjunction with specific plans required in other standards and operations in chapter 46. 

The agency should also consider the effect of this standard on other standards that address command protocol and require coordination and authority, i.e. 12.1.2 and 12.1.4. (O M M M)

The following additions should be made to the 4th Edition Glossary:

Incident Command System- A system for command, control, and coordination of a response that provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual persons and agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident while protecting life property and the environment.  There are five major components: command, planning, operation, logistics and finance/administration.

Exercise- Gathering of individuals inclusive of government and private sector persons, to develop plans, practice simulated implementation, and to discuss each agencies role in handling unusual occurrence incidents.

5th Edition Changes

• Should references to “ Federal Communications Commission (FCC) procedures” be removed from Standard 81.1.2?
• The Internet should be added to the optional means of receiving and disseminating information (81.2.14).
• Some type of quality assurance procedure should be added to 81.2.15 which provides that ,"If the agency authorizes emergency first-aid instruction over the telephone or radio, employees must be trained and have immediate access to approved emergency medical guidelines or materials."
• Should the increasing use of DNA be reflected in Chapter 83 – Collection and Preservation of Evidence?
• Law Enforcement Standard 41.1.4, regarding special purpose vehicles should be added to the Communications Standards Manual. 
• That Standard 51.1.1 Criminal Intelligence be modified to require an agency to have a procedure to share intelligence information on a timely basis with other, appropriate public safety agencies.
• Add a standard near barricaded subject/hostage standard that discusses the "active shooter" situation. (Use in standard the term active "deadly force" situation, as deadly force is clearly defined, and covers "active shooting, stabbing, etc." situations.

Conclusions:

After a general discussion, there was consensus on the following: * Accreditation helped IC by requiring plans to be in place, by providing for procedural reviews and by requiring specific training.

• The issue of crisis management and incident command effected many standards in the 4th Edition. It was felt that since the five year-review of the standards was approaching, many of the changes should be done at that time. In this way, the issues could be better integrated into the manual as a whole.
• The issues raised in 4th Edition Chapter 46, however, were of such a nature as to warrant more immediate action.
• A copy of this report was sent to the Focus Group attendees for their review and comments. The final report was, then, presented to the full CALEA Commission in Jacksonville, Florida in March.

02/11/02