Critical Issues -- First Response
By noon or shortly after, all of the pieces of the response puzzle were
in place. In the very first minutes of the incident and over the next several
hours, many obstacles and concerns came to light that needed to be addressed
by those at the command post, including:
- Number of Shooters--At one time or another, the number of shooters
believed to be involved in the incident ranged from two to eight. Differing
descriptions of the gunmen, different reports of their locations inside
the school, the sheer volume of calls received about sightings and knowledge
related to the incident, different observations made by law enforcement
officers around the school, the number of explosions occurring, and the
number of victims all played a part in the challenge to identify how many
shooters were involved and where they were in the school. Additionally,
there were erroneous reports that a suspect had left the school.
- Entry into Building -- Sheriffís deputies began arriving
at Columbine High School within minutes of the attack.The deputy assigned
to the school engaged one of the suspects in a gun battle as soon as he
stepped out of his patrol car.>Acting on years of training, other deputies
hastily established a perimeter to prevent the escape of the gunmen. Deputies
and officers from other agencies assisted escaping students to safety and
rendered aid to the injured. The Sheriffís SWAT commander arrived
at the scene within 15 minutes of the first shots that were fired. He identified
other tactical officers at the scene and began to assemble an ad hoc team
representing three agencies. Officers who did not know one another, much
less having trained together, entered the school not knowing how many suspects
they might face, their locations, whether hostages had been taken, and
with their sensory and communication abilities severely impaired. Meanwhile
other officers and SWAT teams arrived to assist amid reports of possible
snipers and multiple shooters wearing body armor and armed with automatic
weapons and explosives. The long-established SWAT practice of ìtime,
talk, and tacticsî was discarded out of necessity.
- Containment -- One of the most significant challenges in any
law enforcement situation is the containment of a scene. In a situation
such as the one faced at Columbine, it is critical to the safety of the
public at large that the gunmen not escape. On April 20, law enforcement
established a perimeter around the school within minutes of their arrival.
Deputies moved into positions to rescue and provide protection for the
many children who ran to them for safety, to protect other people who might
try to rush into the school, and to prevent the gunmen from getting out.
If portions of the perimeter were not in place around the school, the suspects
could have slipped out one of the buildingís 25 exits ñ potentially
harming innocent students and staff seeking safety away from the school
and also taking their wrath into the larger community. When the gunmenís
bodies were discovered in the school library with self-inflicted gunshot
wounds, law enforcement also found numerous unexploded devices, knives,
firearms and rounds of live ammunition, more than enough to kill all 56
people initially in the library. By the number of weapons and ammunition
found with them, it was apparent that Harris and Klebold were prepared
to kill or maim many more than the 13 who died at their hands that day.
The number of law enforcement officers on scene within minutes of the reported
shootings plus the entry of SWAT inside the school minutes before their
suicides denied the gunmen additional time to plan further actions or take
other lives or hostages.
- Escaping Suspect (s) -- There was a report that a suspect had
escaped the school. Law enforcement officers on scene were concerned of
who might be behind them and who might be a threat to those groups of students
they were protecting. An additional concern was that if a suspect escaped
Columbine High School, where was he or she going and what was the next
target?
- Medical Assistance for Victims---The continued flow of injured
victims to medical assistance was being accomplished by transporting victims
to one of four triage sites set up in the area. After receiving emergency
medical aid, the injured were transported to one of six regional hospitals.
Shortly after noon, medical personnel came in too close to the school to
rescue several wounded students and were fired on by at least one suspect.
Law enforcement personnel provided cover fire to protect the studentsí
evacuation. As the situation progressed, medical personnel moved closer
to the school in order to get medical assistance to the wounded as quickly
as possible.
- Sniper (s)---There were reports of snipers on the roof of the
school, which could have had an effect on the response and the ability
to approach the scene. As it turned out, there was an innocent person on
the roof of Columbine High School but, at the time, the proper assumption
was that he or she was a suspect/sniper.
- Bombs--There were continued reports of bombs exploding -- a
diversionary device near Wadsworth Boulevard and Ken Caryl Avenue, outside
the school, inside the school, and the discovery of two car bombs in the
student parking lot set on timers. Bomb technicians investigating the initial
diversionary bombs realized that similar bombs with timers and motion-activated
devices could have been placed at the school and relayed that information
to the command post. Ultimately, bomb technicians responded from several
different agencies to safely handle explosive devices as the incident progressed.
- Hostages---There were numerous reports of hostages throughout
the school. This information came from people within the school and from
law enforcement officers who interpreted their observations. Even as late
at 2:26 p.m., a report of possible hostages inside the school was relayed.
Throughout the incident, every room and every contact was managed as though
it was a potential hostage situation. When there was no active gunfire,
the likelihood that there was a hostage taker with hostages increased with
each passing moment.
- Fleeing Students---Somehow, fleeing students of Columbine High
School needed to be gathered and interviewed about their observations of
what was occurring in and around the school. Potentially, some of the fleeing
students could be accomplices of the crime that was occurring.
- Fire---Littleton Fire Department was responsible for the management
of the emergency medical treatments and the preparations for a possible
fire or explosion inside of the school. At least one fire was handled by
the fire sprinkler system in the school but there remained the potential
for more serious fires and explosions. Adding to the concerns were reports
of natural gas odors in the building and the possibility of a natural gas
leak.
- Arriving Parents---As word spread of the shootings at Columbine
High School, parents were responding to the area to obtain information
on the welfare of their children. The challenge of how to assist the parents
of close to 2,000 students and continue to manage the incident unfolding
at the high school was staggering. Leawood Elementary School and Columbine
Public Library were used as central points to reunite parents with their
children and as points where the Jefferson County School District could
disseminate information about the whereabouts of students.
- Evacuations---As the incident seemed to grow in size and complexity,
the need for evacuations of innocent parties became evident. For their
own safety and for the protection of the public, homes and curious people
too close to the area were evacuated.
- Media---Public Information Officer Steve Davis arrived and coordinated
the release of information through Sheriff Stone and Undersheriff Dunaway.
Hourly briefings were held to accommodate the need for the information.
Also, television helicopters were initially hovering around the school
to get their story. While the news helicopters assisted law enforcement
by surveying the rooftops and the grounds, there was also the concern that
images aired live might be seen by suspects inside the school. Those suspects
might be watching the television broadcasts while in the school and would
be able to anticipate or react to the actions of law enforcement outside.
- Investigation---Lt. John Kiekbusch of the Sheriffís Office
Investigation Unit coordinated the start-up of the investigation and utilized
investigators from numerous agencies to collect and report information
coming out of the school, interview witnesses, secure crime scenes related
to the crimes (homes of the suspects, etc.), and prepare warrants based
on initial interviews. The Jefferson County Critical Incident Team for
officer-involved shootings was also activated.
- Traffic---With most of Pierce Street, Bowles Avenue, Fair Avenue
and the surrounding neighborhoods at a standstill, it was imperative to
keep citizens out of the area while still allowing authorized personnel
into the area. Additionally, a clear path had to be established for ambulances
transporting victims to area hospitals.
- Alarms---The piercing sound of alarms going off in the school
was a hindrance to law enforcement personnel trying to search inside. The
control panels to shut off the alarms were in an unsecured area of the
school so the alarms could not be silenced until much later in the afternoon.
- Other Potential Sites--- The command post personnel worried
that, if an organized group had put together the plan of the tragedy now
unfolding at Columbine High School, other places might be targeted as well.
If the enemy was an organized terrorist group, a similar incident or a
ìphase twoî might take place at a nearby high school. Additionally,
there was the possibility that the situation at Columbine was intended
to divert law enforcement from other crimes to be executed elsewhere. If
either of those scenarios became reality, law enforcement would have to
respond and also deploy resources to those sites. Strategies to deal with
another incident that might occur simultaneously were discussed by several
commanders to ensure a response if the need did arise.
- Suspect Homes--After it was determined that Harris and Klebold
were potential suspects, investigators and bomb technicians were dispatched
to respond to their homes and secure the scenes at the residence and adjacent
neighborhood until search warrants could be obtained.
- Crime Scene---Even before the incident was over, lab and evidence
personnel were already planning the processing and handling of the crime
scene. They had to consider not only the school itself, but the suspectsí
homes, the site of the diversionary devices and the school grounds and
surrounding areas had to be addressed.
- Responding Agencies---Individuals as well as agencies came to
the aid of the Jefferson County Sheriffís Office on April 20. The
organization of the responders into worthwhile, functional components ensured
that all of the tasks at hand were accomplished.
- Continuing Updates From Within the School--- As the incident
progressed, further reports of possible hostages and locations of the shooters
continued, often conflicting with other reports also being received. The
differing reports, combined with the time necessary to safely evacuate
students and staff from locked and barricaded areas, slowed the search
of the school.
- SWAT Tactics---Due to Lt. Walcherís seven years of previous
experience on the Jefferson County Sheriffís Office SWAT team, he
knew what tactics and building search methods were being used. In the past,
the Jefferson County Sheriffís Office SWAT team has trained where
there have been ìactive shootersî or ìtarget roomsî
that had to be immediately assaulted. However, shortly after noon on April
20, the reports of active shooters declined (while still receiving reports
of hostages) leading everyone to assume that the shooters were taking hostages
and/or setting up for law enforcement personnel. As Investigator Al Simmons
later told Walcher, ìaround every corner or through every door,
I thought the gunfight was on.î This search, in such a large building,
was a slow process. Rescuing students and staff in barricaded rooms where
they would not open the doors, checking ceilings for potential suspects,
checking all evacuees for weapons (who might be one of the suspects), evacuating
students in the safest way possible to ensure they could not be injured
by potential remaining suspects, and working around explosive devices that
were located throughout the school were some of the challenges that SWAT
teams had to deal with. Additional challenges included the distracting
noise of the alarms, choking smoke that obstructed their vision, and ankle
deep water in some areas as a result of active fire sprinklers.
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